An Analysis of the Copyright Subject Suitability of Artificial Intelligence in the View of Epistemology
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摘要:人工智能著作权主体适格性分析是研究人工智能创作物权属、定性以及行为责任承担的前提，关涉著作权法律制度逻辑的自恰性。以认识论为视角，运用文本、比较和逻辑分析方法分析后可知，人工智能主体适格性与其特定发展阶段是相适应的。弱人工智能与强人工智能阶段，人工智能扮演"工具"角色，不可作为著作权主体，其行为视为自然人的机能器官的延伸，行为产生侵权责任由制造者或使用者承担。类人人工智能和超级人工智能阶段，人工智能具备自主意识，可作为创作者层面上的作者，具备著作权主体资格，在涉及著作权侵权时，如若侵权行为属于独立行为，则应独立承担著作权侵权责任，具体损害赔偿责任可采取著作权侵权保险方式予以承担；如若侵权行为属于制造者或使用者控制或者指示下的行为，则应按照"雇主责任"方式处理，由制造者或使用者替代承担著作权侵权责任。Abstract:when Chinese scholars analyze the suitability of the copyright subject of artificial intelligence,inertia thinking thinks that natural person has consciousness,but artificial intelligence belongs to machinery and does not have consciousness,which is inconsistent with the development of artificial intelligence. When analyzing the position of the copyright subject of artificial intelligence,we should classify it in advance according to the development stage of artificial intelligence,then discuss the corresponding stage. Regardless of the different stages of the development of artificial intelligence,the conclusion that it has or does not have the status of copyright subject in general and blindly will have the incongruity of logic. From the perspective of epistemology,based on the different development stages of artificial intelligence,using the methods of history,comparison and text,this paper analyzes the cognitive premise,cognitive field,cognitive model and human path of artificial intelligence subject suitability. In the stage of weak artificial intelligence and strong artificial intelligence,artificial intelligence plays the role of "tool" and cannot be regarded as the subject of copyright. Its behavior should be regarded as the functional extension of human organs,and the consequences should also belong to the maker or user. In the stage of humanoid artificial intelligence and super artificial intelligence,artificial intelligence can be regarded as the author of nature creators,and it has the qualification of copyright subject,but its ability to act should be restricted. In the case of tort,liability and responsibility should be assigned according to specific circumstances.
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