委托代理理论下应急物资库存成本控制
Inventory Cost Control for Emergency Materials Based on Principal-agent Theory
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摘要:运用委托代理理论方法研究了政府委托应急物资生产企业管理应急物资库存后,存在道德风险时,政府如何激励企业努力降低应急物资库存成本的问题。首先分析不同情形下政府与企业的库存成本构成,继而假设政府利用招标机制将应急物资的采购和库存管理一体化操作,建立满足企业参与约束及激励相容约束条件的政府期望效用最大化模型。最后用遗传算法进行仿真计算,结合算例分析政府和企业在不同情形下的收益与成本,结果表明实施激励可明显增加政府的期望效用。Abstract:By applying the Principal-agent theory, the paper researches the problem of how the government can encourage enterprises to reduce inventory cost of emergency materials when the government delegates enterprise as an agent of reserving emergency materials and under the existence of moral hazard. First, this paper analyzes inventory cost constitution of the government and enterprises in different circumstances; second, this paper establishes the government expected utility maximization model, which meets enterprise participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint, after the government uses tendering mechanism to integrate operation with procurement and inventory of emergency materials; finally, by using genetic algorithms the paper carries out simulations, and takes an example to analyze government and enterprise costs in different circumstances. The results show that the implementation of the incentive can significantly increase the expected utility of the government.
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Key words:
- emergency materials/
- inventory cost/
- moral hazard/
- principal-agent theory
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